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School Law-DISMISSAL FOR CONDUCT UNBECOMING A TEACHERKroll . Independent School Dsitnrc No. 593, 304 N.W.2d 338 (Minn. 1981).
At common law school teachers were considered employees of the local
school board and not public officers., The contract between a school
teacher and the local board of education was terminable by either party
upon substantial breach by the other party 2 and the school board had an
implied power to dismiss a teacher for good and sufficient cause. 3 State
legislatures, through teacher tenure laws, gradually limited the power of
school boards to discharge teachers by designating specific grounds for
dismissal. 4 In 1967 the Minnesota legislature established substantive
1. See State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Educ., 213 Minn. 550, 574, 7 N.W.2d 544, 557
(1942), ovmrmled in part on other grounds, Foesch v. Independent School Dist. No. 646, 300
Minn. 478, 223 N.W.2d 377 (1974); N. EDWARDS, THE COURTS AND THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 475 (1971).
2. W. VALENTE, LAW IN THE SCHOOLS 180 (1980).
3. See Freeman v. Inhabitants of Bourne, 170 Mass. 289, 294, 49 N.E. 435, 436
(1898); Wallace v. School Dist. No. 27, 50 Neb. 171, 175, 69 N.W. 772, 773 (1897); Tadlock v. School Dist. No. 29, 27 N.M. 250, 256, 199 P. 1007, 1009 (1921); Foreman v. School
Dist. No. 25, 81 Or. 587, 594, 159 P. 1155, 1157 (1916); N. EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 475.
See generally F. DELON, LEGAL CONTROLS ON TEACHER CONDUCT: TEACHER DISCIPLINE
7-64 (1977); E. GEE & D. SPERRY, EDUCATION LAW AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: A COMPENDIUM D-14 to D-29 (1978); L. PETERSON, R. ROSsMILLER & M. Vot.z, THE LAW AND
PUBLIC SCHOOL OPERATION §§ 18.12-.19 (2d ed. 1978); W. VALENTE, supra note 2, at
180; Jacobsen, Sperry & Jensen, The Dismirsal and Non-Reemplopment of Teachers, 1 J.L. &
EDUC. 435 (1972); Note, Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1045, 1094-105 (1968).
4. See generally Note, An Illinois Teacher's Right to Retention, Part I Substantive Rghts of
Teachers, 48 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 80, PartI" The ProceduralRights of Teachers Regarding Dismissals, 48 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 260 (1971); 6 HARV. J. LEGIS. 112 (1968). For a brief
overview of Minnesota's teacher tenure law as of 1936, see Jennings, Removal fom Public
Office in Minnesota, 20 MINN. L. REv. 721, 762-69 (1936).
In 1927 the Minnesota legislature enacted the first teacher tenure law, but it was
applicable only to cities of the first class. See Act of Mar. 14, 1927, ch. 36, 1927 Minn.
Laws 42, 42 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 125.17 (1980)). The 1927 teacher tenure
law embodied five provisions for teacher discharge or demotion, including a provision for
conduct unbecoming a teacher. Id § 6, 1927 Minn. Laws at 43.
In 1941 the legislature repealed the entire 1927 Education Code and reenacted the
pre-192 7 version of the teacher tenure law for cities of the first class. See Act of Apr. 10,
1941, ch. 169, art. 10, § 25, 1941 Minn. Laws 227, 343. The 1941 hiring and termination
provision did not include specific grounds for teacher discharge; rather it provided that a
majority vote by the full membership of a school board could terminate a teacher's contract at the close of the school year. Id § 18, 1941 Minn. Laws at 340-41. In the same
Education Code, the legislature enacted a provision whereby a school board could discharge a teacher for cause. See id § 25, 1941 Minn. Laws at 343.
Between 1941 and 1967, when the Minnesota legislature enacted the present two
discharge provisions applicable to cities other than first class cities, see note 5 infra, the
Minnesota Supreme Court focused on the procedural aspects of teacher termination and
not on the substantive basis for dismissal. The court was concerned with procedural due
process afforded the teacher, whether the teacher was given formal charges, notice, and a
hearing, and not with the statutory grounds for discharge. See, e.g., State ex rel Ging v.
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grounds for termination and immediate discharge of school teachers. 5
Despite these statutory guidelines in Minnesota, the decision to discharge
under the immediate discharge or termination provisions remains en6
tirely within the local school board's discretion.
Board of Educ., 213 Minn. 550, 7 N.W.2d 544 (1942), ovemrled in part on other grounds,
Foesch v. Independent School Dist. No. 646, 300 Minn. 478, 223 N.W.2d 377 (1974):
The field of judicial inquiry is not enlarged in the case of discharge of teachers
for cause, essentially an executive function, by the fact that a legislative act requires such court trappings as formal charges, notice, and a hearing ...
So here, neither the district court on certioran nor this court on appeal could
interfere with the school board in its decision as to the existence of statutory
grounds for discharge, provided the board acted in good faith and on a correct
interpretation of the law.
Id at 570-72, 7 N.W.2d at 555-56.
5. See Act of May 25, 1967, ch. 890, § 1, 1967 Minn. Laws 1885, 1887-89 (current
version at MINN. STAT. § 125.12(6), (8) (1980)). The current contract termination provisions read:
Subd. 6 GROUADSFOR TERMINATION. A continuing contract may be terminated, effective at the close of the school year, upon any of the following grounds:
(a) Inefficiency;
(b) Neglect of Duty, or persistent violation of school laws, rules, regulations, or directives;
(c) Conduct unbecoming a teacher which materially impairs his educational effectiveness;
(d) Other good and sufficient grounds rendering the teacher unfit to perform his duties.
A contract shall not be terminated upon one of the grounds specified in
clauses (a), (b), (c), or (d), unless the teacher shall have failed to correct the
deficiency after being given written notice of the specific items of complaint and
reasonable time within which to remedy them.
Subd. 8 IMMEDIA TE DISCHARGE. A school board may discharge a continuing-contract teacher, effective immediately, upon any of the following grounds:
(a) Immoral conduct, insubordination, or conviction of a felony;
(b) Conduct unbecoming a teacher which requires the immediate removal
of the teacher from his classroom or other duties;
(c) Failure without justifiable cause to teach without first securing the
written release of the school board.
(d) Gross inefficiency which the teacher has failed to correct after reasonable written notice;
(e) Willful neglect of duty; or
(0 Continuing physical or mental disability subsequent to a twelve
months leave of absence and inability to qualify for reinstatement in accordance
with subdivision 7.
Prior to discharging a teacher the board shall notify the teacher in writing
and state its grounds for the proposed discharge in reasonable detail. Within ten
days after receipt of this notification the teacher may make a written request for
a hearing befQre the board and it shall be granted before final action is taken.
The board may, however, suspend a teacher with pay pending the conclusion of
such hearing and determination of the issues raised therein after charges have
been filed which constitute ground for discharge.
MINN.STAT. § 125.12(6), (8) (1980).

6. Kroll v. Independent School Dist. No. 593, 304 N.W.2d 338, 334 (Minn. 1981)
("the decision to discharge under one provision or another is totally within the discretion
of local boards of education").
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In Kroll v. Independent School District No. 5937 the Minnesota Supreme
Court recognized the unfairness of school board termination proceedings
under the current Minnesota teacher tenure statute. 8 The court held
that before a teacher could be dismissed for conduct unbecoming a
teacher under either the immediate discharge or termination provision,
the school board must find that the conduct was not remediable. 9
The appellant in Kroll, a tenured teacher, was immediately dismissed
after a hearing in which the school board concluded that she had engaged in "conduct unbecoming a teacher."o The appellant allegedly
had ordered a student to extend his arms in an "airplane" fashion before
the entire class as a disciplinary measure."' Notwithstanding conflicting
testimony, the school board found that appellant held pins under the
student's arms so that he could not lower them.12 The board concluded
that this was an unacceptable form of discipline that required the appellant's immediate removal from the classroom pursuant to Minnesota
Statutes section 125.12, subdivision 8.13
The plaintiff petitioned the district court for a writ of certiorari1 4 on
the grounds that her termination was not proper under the teacher tenure statute. After hearing the matter on its merits, the district court va7. Id
8. Id at 345. "[W]e have on several occasions questioned the fairness of school
board termination proceedings under our current statute." Id.
9. See id at 346. The Kroll court enumerated three factors which a school board
must take into account in finding the teacher's conduct not remediable. The board must
examine the teacher's record as a whole, the severity of the conduct in light of the
teacher's record, and the actual impact of the conduct upon the students. Id at 345-46.
The Kroll decision was further expanded in Ganyo v. Independent School Dist. No.
832, 311 N.W.2d 497 (Minn. 1981). In Ganyo the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that a
teacher, according to statute, must be given a reasonable time in which to correct deficiencies in his teaching practice. Id at 502. The Ganyo court held the minimum eight weeks
from notice to deficiency to notice of termination required by MINN. STAT. § 125.12(6)
was not a reasonable time for a teacher of 17 years to remedy teaching practices which
were now labeled deficient for the first time. Id
10. 304 N.W.2d at 341. The school board based its findings upon the testimony of
three nine-year-old students, coupled with the expert opinion of a social worker who entered the room at the conclusion of the incident. Id The school board did not consider the
teacher's prior record of 23 years in reaching its decision. Id The board based its decision
to immediately dismiss the appellant on the premise that the punishment which the
teacher allegedly implemented was "cruel, excessive, and contrary to the standard of professional conduct established for certified classroom teachers." Id The Kroll court, however, noted that the local school board did not have a written disciplinary policy. Id at
341.
11. Id at 340.
12. The school Board found that this type of punishment constituted a threat of personal pain and harm, as well as an emotional threat to a third grade child and a psychological risk to all other students in the room at the time of the punishment. Id at 341.
13. Id at 340.
14. For a discussion on the use of a writ of certiorari for appellant review in teacher
discharge cases, see note 16 infta.
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cated the writ.15 On appeal the questions were whether the school
board's decision to immediately dismiss the appellant was supported by
substantial evidence 16 and whether the school board's decision to dismiss
pursuant to the immediate discharge provision, rather than the termination provision, was proper.17 The Minnesota Supreme Court held that
the testimony elicited at the hearing did not substantiate the factual findingsl 8 and that the "decision of the respondent school board to dismiss
immediately under subdivision 8 was arbitrary, unreasonable, and contrary to law. 9 The court stressed that the school board's findings must
be supported by probative evidence. 20 The probative value of the evi15. 304 N.W.2d at 340.
16. Id at 341-42. The test for appellate review in matters of teacher termination was
first established in Minnesota in State ex rel.
Ging v. Board of Educ., 213 Minn. 550, 7
N.W.2d 544 (1942), ooerled in part on othergrounds, Foesch v. Independent School Dist. No.
646, 300 Minn. 478, 223 N.W.2d 377 (1974). The Ging court stated:
[A] limited jurisdiction by way of certiorari, and in some cases by statutory appeal, is conferred upon the courts. This is necessarily confined to questions affecting the jurisdiction of the board, the regularity of its proceedings, and, as to
merits of the controversy, whether the order or determination in a particular case
was arbitrary, oppressive, unreasonable, fraudulent, under an erroneous theory
of law, or without any evidence to support it.
Id at 570-71, 7 N .W.2d at 556. For more recent restatements of this test, see Whaley v.
Anoka-Hennepin Indep. School Dist. No. 11, 325 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. 1982); Liffrig v.
Independent School Dist. No. 442, 292 N.W.2d 726, 729 (Minn. 1980); State ex re.Lucas
v. Board of Educ., 277 N.W.2d 524, 526 (Minn. 1979); Foesch v. Independent School Dist.
No. 646, 300 Minn. 478, 485, 223 N.W.2d 371, 375 (1974).
17. 304 N.W.2d at 342. The Kroll court reasserted that it has a limited role in reviewing the evidence upon which the school board based its findings. Id
The court repeated the well-established rule that it is not at liberty to hear the case de
novo and substitute its findings for those of the school board. Id; cf Mahnerd v. Canfield,
297 Minn. 148, 152, 211 N.W.2d 177, 180 (1973) (reviewing civil service examinations);
Sellin v. City of Duluth, 248 Minn. 333, 337-39, 80 N.W.2d 67, 70-72 (1956) (removal of
municipal employee by administrative board); State ex ret. Hart v. Common Council, 53
Minn. 238, 242, 243, 55 N.W. 118, 119 (1893) (court had right to review dismissal of two
members of Board of Fire Commissioners for cause).
In Ganyo v. Independent School Dist. No. 832, 311 N.W.2d 497 (Minn. 1981), the
Minnesota Supreme Court required that the findings of the school board be written findings which not only set out the specific charge or charges upon which the school based its
decision but also the basic facts developed in the evidence which, in the board's judgment,
support the charge or charges. Id at 500 n.3. Mere restatement of the alleged deficiencies
as findings of fact is insufficient. Id
18. Id at 342. The court also found that the substantial evidence did not support the
board's findings of harm sufficient to justify an immediate dismissal of the appellant. The
court noted that there was no actual harm to any of the students and the only evidence
presented at the hearing was of potential psychological harm. This potential psychological harm did not meet the threshold of actual harm. Id. at 346.
19. Id
20. Id at 342. The evidentiary rule that the Kroll court used in reviewing the school
board's findings was first adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490 (1951) (record evidence of agency finding must
appear substantial when viewed as a whole by court of appeals).
Even though a school board does not have to observe the rules of evidence in its
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dence relied on by the school board was negated by the inconsistent testi2
mony adduced at the hearing. 1
The pivotal issue in Kroll, whether the school board had discretion to
immediately dismiss a teacher for "conduct unbecoming a teacher," was
one of first impression for the Minnesota Supreme Court.22 The court
recognized the need to balance the competing interests of local school
board control of teacher discipline and job security for teachers who have
proven their fitness. 2 3 The court acknowledged that a balance must be
struck between the local school board's discretion in disciplining teachers
and the teachers' interest in knowing that they will be immediately dis2
missed only if their conduct is not remediable. 4
The court in Kroll noted that the statutory provisions for teacher termination lend themselves to two different constructions: a detrimental
impact approach and a remediability approach. 25 The respondent argued that a school board's decision to dismiss a teacher under either provision should be made by a detrimental impact analysis. This analysis
focuses on the teacher's conduct and the impact of the conduct on the
student and the class. 26 The Kroll court rejected this approach because it
quasi-judicial role, the Kroll court, noting that there must be limits to the type of evidence
that the school board can hear, stated, "The board should not have to find support for its
determination in hearsay or to make deductions from opinions and view relating to technical or theoretical principles." 304 N.W.2d at 342 (citing Morey v. Independent School
Dist. No. 492, 271 Minn. 445, 449, 136 N.W.2d 105, 108 (1965)).
21. Id The Kroll court found that the school board's reliance on the inconsistent testimony of the three children, the social worker, and the teacher effectively negated the
probative value of the evidence. Id
22. Id at 344. But see Liffring v. Independent School Dist. No. 442, 292 N.W.2d 726
(Minn. 1980) (principal's employment terminated under MINN. STAT. § 125.12(8) for immoral conduct and conduct unbecoming a principal).
23. 304 N.W.2d at 344. See general/y Keller v. Independent School Dist. No. 742, 302
Minn. 324, 327-29, 224 N.W.2d 749, 752 (1974); Foesch v. Independent School Dist. No.
646, 300 Minn. 478, 485, 223 N.W.2d 371, 375 (1974); McSherry v. City of St. Paul, 202
Minn. 102, 108, 277 N.W. 541,544 (1938); Anderson v. Consolidated School Dist. No. 144,
196 Minn. 256, 257-58, 264 N.W. 784, 785 (1936).
24. 304 N.W.2d at 344. For a discussion of these "tensions," see Gee, Teacher Dusmirsa" A View fom Mount Healthy, 60 B.Y.U. L. REV. 255 (1980).
25. 304 N.W.2d at 344-45. The court reasoned that because the teacher tenure statute was susceptible to both the detrimental impact approach and the remediability approach, the court was permitted to provide an interpretation of the statute that best
corresponds to the intent of the legislation. See 304 N.W.2d at 345 (citing Beck v. City of
St. Paul, 304 Minn. 438, 445, 231 N.W.2d 919, 923 (1975) (court interprets legislative
intent of amendment to zoning ordinance)).
26. The school board argued for the detrimental impact analysis because "conduct
unbecoming a teacher" is distinguished in the two provisions by language that emphasizes
the urgency to immediately discharge the teacher based on the extreme nature of the
teacher's conduct. Id at 344; see also Respondent's Brief at 12, Kroll v. Independent
School Dist. No. 593, 304 N.W.2d 338 (Minn. 1981). The more serious the teacher's improper conduct, the more appropriate the subdivision 8 termination. The statutory lan-
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failed to consider a teacher's prior exemplary record. 27
The Kroll court adopted the appellant's remediability interpretation of
the discharge provisions.28 Relying on the legislative purpose in creating
two termination procedures, 29 the court concluded that the remediability
approach achieved the requisite balance between the administrative discretion of local school boards and the prevention of arbitrary dismissals
of competent teachers.3 0 In reaching this conclusion, the court observed
the parallel between the Minnesota teacher tenure laws and the two-step
discharge procedure'followed in Illinois.31
The Kroll court cited with approval the Illinois case of Gil/ilandv. Board
ofEducation of PleasantConsolidatedSchool DistrictNo. 622,32 which set forth
a test for determining whether misconduct is remediable. 33 The Gilliland
test for determining remediability is "whether damage has been done to
guage qualifying the levels of severity lends itself easily to the detrimental impact
interpretation. See id at 14.
The detrimental impact approach calls for the school board to balance the "material
impairment of educational effectiveness" of subdivision 6, with the need for "immediate
removal from the classroom" of subdivision 8. If the teacher's conduct in a particular
incident is extremely harmful to the student or the class, then the teacher should be dismissed immediately. See 304 N.W.2d at 344.
The plaintiff argued that the remediable/irremediable approach is most consistent
with the Minnesota statutory scheme of two separate provisions for "conduct unbecoming
a teacher." If the school board determines that a teacher's conduct is remediable, then the
board would proceed under section 125.12(6) and give the teacher a remedial notice specifying the conduct to be remedied in a reasonable time. If the school board determined
that the teacher's conduct was irremediable, then the teacher would be immediately dismissed under section 125.12(8). See Appellant's Brief at 25-26, Kroll v. Independent
School Dist. No. 593, 304 N.W.2d 338 (Minn. 1981).
27. 304 N.W.2d at 345.
28. Id
29. Compare MINN. STAT. § 125.12(6), (8) (1980) (two provisions for teacher termination applicable to cities outside of the first class) with MINN. STAT. § 125.17(4) (1980) (one
provision for teacher termination applicable only to cities of the first class).
30. 304 N.W.2d at 345. Whether the existence of two different teacher termination
provisions in Minnesota, one for teachers of first class cities and the other for teachers
outside of first class cities, is a violation of the equal protection clause has never been
raised.
31. Id
32. 67 Ill.
2d 143, 365 N.E.2d 322 (1977).
33. Id at 153, 365 N.W.2d at 326. In Gillilandthe court embellished the remediable
statutory approach by judicial ruling. The Illinois teacher tenure statute and the Minnesota teacher tenure statute are not identical. &e note 35 infra. Without the Gilliland remediable test there would be little similarity between the Illinois teacher tenure statute and
the Minnesota teacher tenure statute. See id
A board of education has the authority to determine initially whether its grounds for
dismissal of a tenured elementary teacher are remediable or irremediable. At the dismissal hearing, the board must make a finding of fact to determine whether the evidence
established that the misconduct was remediable. Gilliland v. Board of Educ., 35 Il. App.
3d 861, 866, 343 N.E.2d 704, 709 (1976), rev'don other grounds, 67 Ill. 2d 143, 365 N.E.2d
322 (1977).
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the students, faculty, or school, and whether the conduct resulting in that
damage could have been corrected had the teacher's superiors warned
her."34 In Illinois, once a school board has determined that a teacher's
conduct is remediable, the teacher tenure statute requires the board to
give the teacher written notice of the conduct, which, if not remedied,
35
may result in dismissal.
34. 67 Ill.
2d 143, 153, 365 N.E.2d 322, 326 (1977). This remediable test has been
reaffirmed. See Grissom v. Board of Educ., 75 Ill.
2d 314, 331-32, 388 N.E.2d 398, 405
(1979); Aulwurm v. Board of Educ., 67 11.2d 434, 442, 367 N.E.2d 1337, 1341 (1977).
35. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-12 (1980). The removal and dismissal provision
of the Illinois teacher tenure statute provides:
Before setting a hearing on charges stemming from causes that are considered
remediable, a board must give the teacher a reasonable warning in writing, stating specifically the charges which, if not removed, may result in charges. The
hearing officer shall, with reasonable dispatch, make a decision as to whether or
not the teacher shall be dismissed and shall give a copy of the decision to both
the teacher and the school board.
Id
In the Illinois teacher tenure statute, there is only one provision which focuses on
teacher dismissal and contract termination. See id In the Minnesota teacher tenure statute for cities outside of the first class, there are two separate provisions on teacher dismissals. The first provision of the Minnesota statute, which focuses on the general grounds for
termination, includes a remedial notice requirement. MINN. STAT. § 125.12(6) (1980).
The second provision, which states the grounds for immediate discharge, does not require
remedial notice. See id § 125.12(8).
The Kroll court addressed the fact that the Minnesota teacher tenure statute does not
delineate the procedure school boards are to follow in determining whether to dismiss a
teacher under the general termination or immediate discharge provision, and held that a
school must make an initial determination as to whether the teacher's conduct is remediable. If the board finds that the conduct was remediable, then the board must proceed
along the remedial notice route. If the board's initial determination is that the conduct is
irremediable, then the board would proceed under the immediate discharge provision and
follow all the procedural safeguards detailed in the teacher tenure statute. See 304 N.W.2d
at 345.
The major difference between the Illinois and Minnesota teacher tenure statutes is
that the Illinois provision requires the school board's decision to be reviewed by an impartial hearing examiner. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-12 (1980). The Minnesota statute has no comparable safeguard. However, the Kroll court did recommend such a
procedure. See 304 N.W.2d at 345 & n.3.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has questioned the fairness of termination proceedings under the current statute, which permits local school boards to exercise the three-part
role of prosecutor, judge and jury. See Ganyo v. Independent School Dist. No. 832, 311
N.W.2d 497, 499 n.2 (Minn. 1981); Kroll v. Independent School Dist. No. 593, 304
N.W.2d 338, 345 & n.3 (Minn. 1980); Liffrig v. Independent School Dist. No. 442, 292
N.W.2d 726, 730 (Minn. 1980). To lessen this potential prejudicial impact upon termination proceedings the Kroll court emphasized that, in the absence of unusual or extenuating
circumstances, a hearing examiner should be hired in all cases. 304 N.W.2d at 345 & n.3.
The court in Ganvo further suggested that the hearing examiners not be limited to taking
evidence but, by analogy to the Administrative Procedure Act, MINN. STAT. § 15.052(3)
(1980), also make detailed findings and conclusions which would then be available to the
school board in reaching its decision on termination. 311 N.W.2d 497, 499 n.2 (Minn.
1981). Still greater consistency would be realized, however, through legislative authoriza-
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The Kroll court believed that the Gillilandtest was too narrow in that it
required examination of the teacher's conduct leading to the disciplinary
action but not the teacher's prior record. 36 The court stated three factors
that a school board must consider before determining the remediability
of a teacher's conduct. First, the school board must review the teacher's
entire record. 37 Consideration of the teacher's prior record avoids the discharge of teachers who have demonstrated their fitness.
Second, the severity of the teacher's conduct must be examined. 38
This factor focuses on the degree of harm that the teacher's conduct
causes and whether it harms a student, the class, or the school system in
general.39 The school board has discretion to determine whether one incident is sufficient to discharge a teacher or whether repeated misconduct
is necessary. 40 The Kroll court stressed that no matter how harmful the
conduct of the teacher, immediate dismissal for a single incident must be
1
justified in light of the teacher's entire record.4
Finally, the presence of actual or threatened harm in the teacher's conduct must be considered. 42 The nature of the harm, whether physical or
psychological, is relevant. 43 The Kroll court was hesitant to expand on
the harm factor, but noted that a school board might take prophylactic
measures to prevent the harm from recurring.44
The three-factor remediable approach offered by the Kroll court provides guidelines for local school boards in the complex area of teacher
dismissals. The method of analysis presented by the Kroll decision should
work to protect teachers from arbitrary dismissals while allowing school
tion of the use of hearing examiners in teacher dismissal proceedings and through the

enactment of uniform termination procedures.
36. 304 N.W.2d at 345.
37. Id
38. Id at 345-46.
39. Id at 346.
40. Id In support of this statement, the Kroll court cited a Pennsylvania case in which
a teacher shoved a student's head against a blackboard. Landi v. West Chester Area
School Dist., 23 Pa. Commw. 586, 590, 353 A.2d 895, 897 (1976). The Minnesota court
did not instruct school boards on how to analyze the more common teacher dismissal areas
of insubordination, incompetency, or inefficiency under the remediable analysis. See also
Thurston, Tenured Teacher Dismissal in llhnois 1975-79, 69 ILL. B.J. 422 (1981) (misconduct,
insubordination, and incompetence are the most common areas of discharge and physical
abuse of students is one of the least frequent reasons given for teacher termination).
41. 304 N.W.2d at 346.
42. Id The court did not examine the relationship between threatened and psychological harm. Id The respondent argued that the threatened harm in Kroll met the
threshold of actual harm. See Respondent's Brief at 16, Kroll v. Independent School Dist.
No. 593, 304 N.W.2d 338 (Minn. 1981).
43. 304 N.W.2d at 346.
44. The court noted that a school board does not have to wait for harm to come to
the students before discharging a teacher. Id The court's brevity in this area is a clear
indication of the court's deference to the local school board's judgment as to the particulars of a given incident.
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boards the power to swiftly discharge teachers who have demonstrated
their unfitness45 through incompetence, inefficiency, insubordination, or
neglect of duty.46

Tort-

ABROGATION OF PARENTAL IMMUNITY--AnderSon V. Stream, 295

N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980).
Parental immunity is a judicially created rule that denies minor children a cause of action in tort against their parents.' In the last eighteen
years the doctrine has been attacked in the courts, 2 resulting in a trend
toward its judicial abrogation. 3 In the 1968 case ofSilesky v. Ke/man4 the
45. The Minnesota Supreme Court has not ruled on a teacher dismissal case based on
homosexuality or other possible immoral conduct charges. But ef Gish v. Board of Educ.,
145 NJ. Super. 96, 104-05, 366 A.2d 1337, 1342 (1976) (school board's interest in protecting students justified dismissal of homosexual teacher); Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist.
No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340 (1977) (prior record of dismissed teacher irrelevant because of danger to students from teacher's present homosexuality); Fleming, Teacher
Dismisalfor Cause. Public & Pnoat Morality, 7 J.L. & EDUC. 423 (1978).
46. The Minnesota teacher tenure statute already provides a two-step analysis for
each of these provisions. Compare MINN. STAT. § 125.12(6) (1980) with MINN. STAT.
§ 125.12(8) (1980).
1. See Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431,432-33, 161 N.W.2d 631, 632 (1968); Briere
v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 434, 224 A.2d 588, 590 (1966) Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 376,
282 A.2d 351, 353 (1971); Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wash. 2d 411,412, 610 P.2d 891 (1980);
see also 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 219, 219 n. 1 (1980) (history and rationale of parentchild tort immunity doctrine).
2. See, e.g., Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963); see also 6 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 219, 221 n. 11 (listing 21 states that have abrogated parent-child tort
immunity in whole or in part). Wisconsin was one of the first jurisdictions to substantially
limit parental tort immunity.
3. Jurisdictions eliminating parent-child tort immunity have adopted four main approaches to abrogation: total abrogation, see, e.g., Peterson v. City of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii
484, 486, 462 P.2d 1007, 1008 (1969); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 405, 528 P.2d 1013,
1017-18 (1974); the reasonable parent standard, see, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914,
921, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 293 (1971) (the reasonable parent standard
recognizes a parent's prerogative and duty to exercise authority over his minor child, but
within reasonable limits); abrogation except for activities associated with family relationships or objectives, see, e.g., Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 206, 241 N.E.2d 12, 15
(1968) (immunity is preserved "for conduct of either a parent or child arising out of the
family relationship and directly connected with the family purposes and objectives"); and,
abrogation with specific exceptions, see, e.g., Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 413, 122
N.W.2d 193, 198 (1963) (abrogated immunity except "(1) where the alleged negligent act
involves an exercise of parental authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act act involves an exercise or ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care'); see also
Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 89,471 P.2d 282, 285 (1970) (discusses parental immunity
generally indicating Wisconsin standard persuasive but not specifically adopted because it
was unnecessary to decide instant case); Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 8, 199 N.W.2d
169, 172-73 (1972) (adopts hybrid of Gibson and Goller, adding reasonableness to modify
parental authority in first Goiter exception).
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